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Introduction 
While most Southern European public broadcasting systems are to some degree subject to 
political influence and dependence, in the case of Greece, the Hellenic Radio and Television 
(ERT), stands out: it has the dubious distinction of being labelled a ‘state’ rather than ‘public’ 
broadcaster. This public perception is related to ERT’s one-time role as a mouthpiece of 
government propaganda and its on-going close relationship with the government of the day. 
As both radio and TV broadcasting were launched under dictatorships, they have long been 
regarded as ‘arms of the state’. Post-dictatorship politics and the restoration of Parliament 
in 1974 saw the Conservatives and Socialists dominating the political scene, accusing each 
other of too much governmental control over state electronic media. Even the ‘new ERT’, 
re-launched in 2015 by the left-wing SYRIZA government after a two-year closure, has been 
criticised for government interference. This situation has largely arisen from the ‘traditional’ 
political tensions in Greek society and the overextended character of the Greek state, since 
the latter plays an active role in the formation of the Greek economy and policy. In the case 
of broadcasting the state not only intervenes but is an active agent. 
This chapter analyses whether the ERT can be considered a public or a state 
broadcaster. The first section briefly addresses the relationship between the media and 
politics in Greece and the role of the strong clientist state in the development of media, as 
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against a weak civil society. Part two looks at the history of the Greek media, the functioning 
of ERT in its early stages of development, and the impact of deregulation and market 
liberalization on the public broadcaster since the early 1990s. The role of communications 
regulatory agency (ESR) in the process of allocating licences and combating market failures 
such as oligopolistic trends is also examined. The third section explores how independent 
financially, editorially and politically the ERT is under the current SYRIZA left-wing 
administration. 
 
Politics and media in Greece 
All media systems in general, and public broadcasting systems in particular, are to some 
degree subject to political power, and disputes over the independence of public 
broadcasting are common to the history of European media.  
In the case of Greece, broadcasting has developed a symbiotic relationship with the 
political upheavals of the country – both radio and television broadcasting were introduced 
under dictatorships in modern Greece's troubled history. Radio broadcasting was 
established in the late 1930s under the Metaxas dictatorship and television in the mid-1960s 
under the Colonels (1967-74) (Papathanassopoulos, 1997). Consequently, both radio and 
television have been regarded as ‘arms of the state.’ Moreover, the whole debate about the 
electronic state media in Greece before deregulation of the sector was focused on 
governmental control and interference in television programmes. This condition has 
become part of post-dictatorship ritualized politics and since Parliament was re-established 
in 1974, the Conservatives and Socialists have dominated the political scene accusing each 
other of too much governmental control over state broadcasting media. 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1999). 
This situation has largely arisen from the political tensions in Greek society since the 
Second World War. These tensions, combined with the absence of a strong civil society, 
have made the state an autonomous and dominant factor in Greek society. The state is not 
only relatively autonomous but also has an ‘over-extended’ character. Mouzelis (1980, pp. 
261-4) points out that this situation has been associated with a weak, atrophied civil society 
where the state has to take on an additional politico-ideological function. This makes the 
system less self-regulatory than nations with developed capitalism such as exists in Britain 
or in the US. Thus, the state has to intervene and adopt a dirigist attitude because it has to 
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'fill the gaps' in various sectors of the economy and of society. Mouzelis (1980, p. 263) notes 
that because of the persistence of patronage politics, even bourgeois parties and interest 
groups are articulated within the state machinery in a clientist/personalistic manner.  
This   interrelationship has affected the development of the news media in many 
ways (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2000; Hallin & Mancini 2004; Papathanassopoulos 
2005).  First, it has encouraged the use of the news media for other purposes than the 
balanced provision of news stories. The politicization of business is a result not only of the 
important role the state plays in the economy, but of the nature of the political process. 
“What was important for an interest group”, write Lanza and Lavdas (2000, p. 207) about 
Italy and Greece, “was its ability to establish a special and privileged bond with a party, a 
sector in the public administration, a branch of the executive, a politician or a civil servant.  
In this way, institutions became permeable; otherwise they remained totally impermeable.” 
In northern Europe clientelist relationships have been displaced to a large extent by 
rational-legal forms of authority and, especially in the smaller continental European 
countries, by democratic corporatist politics, both of which decrease the need for economic 
elites to exert particularistic pressures and form partisan alliances (Hallin & 
Papathanassopoulos 2002, Hallin & Mancini 2004). In countries with a history of clientelism, 
rational-legal authority is less strongly developed. The judiciary and administrative 
apparatus are more party-politicised and there is often a tradition of avoiding the 
implementation of the laws. The persistence of a culture in which evasion of the law is 
relatively common means that opportunities for particularistic pressures are common: 
governments can exercise pressure by enforcing the law selectively, and news media can do 
so by selectively threatening to expose wrongdoing (Papathanassopoulos, 2013).  Legal 
proceedings against media owners are thus fairly common in many southern European 
countries (Papathanassopoulos 2004). 
This situation has also affected the content of the media as a means of negotiation 
among conflicting elites, rather than a means of informing the public. Looking at the mass 
communication sector in general (Greece is not unique in this regard) the strong state in its 
role as a rule-maker defines the extent of the relative autonomy it is willing to grant to the 
media. Even in the case of the press, which enjoys a liberal regime, the state defines press 
autonomy. This can easily be seen in the press laws or in cases of declared national 
emergency, where the state reserves the right to infringe or restrict press autonomy. In a 
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more indirect but equally effective way, the state acts to enforce these formal rules, as well 
as to implement the unwritten rules of power politics, by using a wide range of means of 
intervention that are at its disposal. A very effective means that the state uses to enforce 
written press limits is to provide sizeable financial aid to the press, on which individual 
enterprises become dependent since they could not otherwise cover their production costs. 
Since entrepreneurs in public construction projects were also active in the media field, they 
cross-subsidized their media outlets from revenues made out of public projects (see also 
Leandros, 2010).  Recourse to the courts and the imposition of censorship, including 
suspension of publication, although remain possible tools of control, are less commonly 
employed. (Papathanassopoulos, 2013) Means of control have continued to evolve, 
however: one recent – and effective – means of exercising control was the approval of 
financial aid though bank loans under the auspices of the government. In most of the cases 
the media owners could not pay off their loans.  
In the case of broadcasting the state not only intervenes but is an active agent. 
Greek broadcasting was established, as in most European countries, as a state monopoly 
which remained after the restoration of Parliament. According to the Constitution of 1975, 
‘radio and television will be under the direct control of the state’ (Alivizatos, 1986; 
Dagtoglou, 1989). Although ‘direct control’ did not necessarily mean ‘state monopoly’, state 
monopoly was justified on the grounds of limited frequencies being available, as well as the 
need to provide full geographical coverage for such a mountainous country with its many 
islands. Thus, the state became the sole agent of the broadcast media. The government 
manipulation of state TV news output is a suitable example of the dirigist role of the state, 
since it has traditionally reflected and reinforced government views and policies 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2013). 
As a result, ministerial censorship was common practice and state control was 
greater than was usual elsewhere. The general pattern of the Greek state broadcasting 
media was (and still is) that a transfer of political power will be followed by an equivalent 
changeover in the state media institutions' executives. The outcome, especially in the past, 
was news and editorial judgments of particular importance that were in close agreement, if 
not identical, to the government announcements on a whole range of policies and decisions. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that those holding positions of responsibility in state 
broadcasting have come and gone in step with the political parties that constitute the 
5 
 
government of the day. This is as true for governments led by New Democracy 
(Conservative) as it is for those formed by PASOK (Socialist). The common cycle is that each 
side deplores the policy when in opposition, only to discover is merits anew once they have 
been appointed to government.  
 In the era of the dominance of private television such a practice may appear absurd. 
However, the political affiliation of the executives of the public broadcaster is self-evident, 
as all parties in the opposition still accuse the government of the day-to-day control of the 
news output. In this sense, it could be said that PSB never really existed in Greece. The 
troubled political history of the country formed a state, rather than a public, broadcaster.  
To understand this, one has to note that the television license fee is not collected directly 
from households possessing a television set, but is levied as a component of electricity bills. 
In fact, there has never been a license fee in the form familiar to many Western countries. 
By and large, in Greece the public broadcaster was unable to function according to the 
public service regulations compared with those in Britain or Scandinavia or other northern 
European countries. As Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp. 106-7) note, ‘it is probably significant 
that democracy was restored [...] at a time when the welfare state was on the defensive in 
Europe, and global forces of neoliberalism were strong’. In other words, the deregulatory 
deluge of the 1980s found the state broadcaster unprepared and weak, as well the rest of 
the media system in general and the daily newspapers in particular. 
 
The media in Greece 
Since the fall of the military junta in 1974, the Greek press has undergone a process of 
modernization. The introduction of new printing technologies in the 1980s (Leandros 1992), 
the entry of private investors into the media sector, and strong competition from television 
have changed the media sector (Psychoyios 1992, Zaoussis & Stratos 1992, Paraschos 1995). 
Print media have had to reposition themselves: editorial content has had become more 
objective, and close ties with political parties were loosened. The reasons for these changes 
stem largely the press’s need to attract a broader spectrum of readers in order to increase 
circulation in times when the rate of economic and social development in Greece were 
again declining. It has reflected, in part, a drift away from the political party community 
itself towards the major political orientations of the modern Greek electorate. In effect, this 
means that the Greek media, collectively, is still a very influential institution, usually 
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aggressive and sensationalist in tone, especially in periods characterized by a climate of 
political tension and, of course, at election time (Komninou 1996). 
The deregulation of radio took place in 1987, followed by the deregulation of 
television in late 1989. As in most European countries, the imminent deregulation of Greek 
broadcasting was associated with partisan ends, and eventually led to a haphazard political 
reaction, rather than a coherent plan. The result was an overcrowded broadcasting market 
in Greece (Papathanassopoulos 1997; 2001). In November 1989, the first private channel 
called Mega Channel entered the Greek television landscape, and a month later a second 
channel, by the name of Antenna TV, followed. Since then, a plethora of national, regional 
and local television channels have sprung up all over the country without, however, an 
official license to broadcast. In effect, in Greece eight national private channels, 3 state 
channels and fully 153 local and regional channels are operational. From the very first year 
of their existence, the general content orientation of private channels has dominated the 
television sector in terms of audience ratings and advertising expenditure. At the same time, 
the emergence of private stations has had disastrous effects on the public broadcaster. 
The Greek media are primarily characterized by an excess of supply over demand. 
This logic of this oversupply characterization seems undeniable, since a plethora of 
newspapers, TV channels, magazines and radio stations find themselves competing for a 
small-country audience and consequently limited advertising market share 
(Papathanassopoulos 1999).  
But when politics become the determinant factor in shaping the re-organisation of 
the broadcasting scene, it is bound to produce less-than-ideal results and many side effects. 
Some of them have been: 
• The rapid and disproportionate increase in the number of channels in a country of 
only 3.3 million households; 
• The increase of media cross-ownership since the speed with which the publishers 
and other business interests moved into the broadcasting landscape was impressive; 
(In fact, leading politicians and analysts have been concerned over how easily and 
quickly the media sector could be concentrated in the hands of a few influential 
media magnates (Papathanassopoulos, 2004, p. 67).)   
• Successive governments have shown an inability to intervene and regulate. It is no 
coincidence that every time the government announces its willingness to grant 
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official TV licenses, general elections come to interrupt the process. In effect, the 
procedure for granting operating licenses to broadcast stations has been an 
unresolved issue from the very first days of the introduction of commercial 
television. In this unregulated field, all private local and national TV channels are, 
technically speaking, ‘illegal’, without operating licenses, using television frequencies 
that are state property. In effect, the Greek government has attempted to allocate 
TV licenses without success in the past. In 1998, the then Socialist government 
decided that all TV stations that had applied for a TV license should be considered as 
temporary grantees of TV licenses. The new Syriza-Anel coalition government 
announced that it would award 4 national TV licenses. The plan came to nothing, as 
the country’s highest administrative court, the Council of State, ruled that the whole 
procedure was unconstitutional. On May 2, 2018, the broadcasting regulator, the 
National Council for Radio and Television (ESR), approved the applications of five 
media companies to receive a temporary nationwide broadcasting license. The ESR 
unanimously concluded that SKAI, Star, Alpha, Antenna TV and Epsilon TV met the 
requirements laid out in the regulator’s call for tenders and abided by the relevant 
regulations. 
• Unregulated and indebted television channels degrade notions of quality and 
freedom of speech. It has been argued that only a strong PSB could ‘show' the way 
to quality in such a commercialised and anarchic environment (Panagiotopoulou, 
2006). But the political parties, while climbing on and off the commercial 
bandwagon, gave no real thought as to how to renovate the public sector and 
redefine the concept and mission of PSB. 
Although the developments in the Greek media sector may not entirely meet the needs 
of its associated advertising industry, it has been surprisingly adaptable to swings in the 
economic business cycle (Papathanassopoulos 1997). The fiscal crisis that began in 2009, 
however, coupled with the economic crisis, brought major losses of advertising revenues 
for the media industry. Additionally, the current austerity package put in place by the so-
called Troika, the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the European Central Bank (ECB), which aims at restoring the Greek economy, is set 




ERT: The mouthpiece of the government and the victim of a haphazard deregulation 
The deregulation of Greek broadcasting, as in other European countries, was more than the 
removal of certain rules and regulations. Greece, as an EU Member State, was also 
influenced by the Community's policies and the European political environment 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1999, pp. 391-4; Iosifidis, 2007b, p. 77). The 1980s was the era of 
broadcasting deregulation in almost all European countries. This environment provided 
good motives to domestic Greek forces with neoliberal ideologies to press for the removal 
of obstacles to the introduction of market forces in the sector (Papathanassopoulos, 2005). 
ERT’s history is identified with the history of Greek broadcasting, but the emergence 
of private stations has been disastrous for the public broadcaster. ERT has sharply declined 
in ratings and advertising revenues, which resulted in large advertising losses. ERT's TV 
channels' viewership has decreased tremendously shanked (ET1 - 9.08%, ET2 - 5.6% in 1992, 
ET1 4.5% and ET2 3.7% in 1997) which has resulted in large advertising losses. In effect, 
ERT's three channels have witnessed a steady erosion of market share since private 
television launched in late 1989 (see Diagram 1).  Nowadays, 80% of ERT’s funds derive from 
the license fee, while 20% from advertising revenue, while ERT1 and ERT 2 attract 6% and 
2% of the viewership respectively, according to Nielsen. ERT’s decline in viewership was 
principally due to the fact that ERT’s news programmes were regarded as pure government 
propaganda with low trust among the audiences (Sorogas, 2000).  Moreover, the 
government did not prepare the public broadcaster for the new environment in which it 
would have to take on its private competitors. On the contrary, successive governments, 
both Conservative and Socialist, consistently failed to invest in the public broadcaster, at the 
same time it was facing chronic financial problems (Valoukos, 2008; Papathanassopoulos, 
1997). It is not a coincidence that ERT’s audiences was composed principally of the older 
generation (55 years and older) and mainly the male viewers of this age segment.   
ERT’s management and the government realised that the public broadcaster could 
no any longer justify its presence in the system. ERT was too bureaucratic, weighed down by 
an accumulated debt of €112 million (Typaldou, 1997); worse still, its programming was 
uncompetitive and its news output lacked credibility. Moreover, since 1989, politicians had 
been unable to approve any of the numerous plans for the public broadcaster’s rescue. In 
the recent history of the Greek public broadcaster there have been three attempts from 
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opposite directions to turn the public broadcaster around (Papathanassopoulos, 2010). 
Unfortunately, all three failed.  
 
The 1997 attempt to restructure ERT under the modernists  
ERT’s management under the Simitis Administration [1996-2004DATES] aimed to turn a new 
page in its troubled history. Since the turn of the century, the PSB’s managing directors 
aimed, with the government’s blessing, to restructure the corporation. The re-organisation 
of ERT has been a two-pronged approach: first, regarding the organisational structure of the 
broadcaster and second, renovating ERT channels’ profiles and their public image. 
In 1997 ERT’s management, at the government’s request, changed the face of the 
state broadcaster in order to re-launch with the Greek public. In effect, its flagship channel, 
ET 1, became a general, quality-entertainment channel and adopted a family entertainment 
profile. Its programming consisted of motion pictures, telefilms, Greek series (in the last 
three TV seasons, it has produced 27 new TV Greek series with well-known Greek actors and 
directors) and children’s programming, as well as international sporting events such as the 
Olympic Games, World and European soccer championships and European Final-Four 
basketball championships. 
The second channel, formerly known as ET2, no longer exists under its old name but 
has been re-launched and dubbed NET (Nea Elliniki Teleorasi – New Hellenic Television). It 
mostly airs 24-hour news and current affairs programming, with news bulletins, information 
programs, talk shows, documentaries and live soccer games.  
ET3, as noted, is rather independent from the main corporation and it also forms its 
programming independently from the other two ERT channels. It is a generalist channel with 
an emphasis on news and quality programmes and with a particular focus on Northern 
Greece. By and large, the changes have been welcomed by the audience (Sorogas, 2000) 
and this can be seen in the TV ratings shown in Table 1. Since 1997, ERT’s strategy has 
aimed both to increase its profile in the Greek market and develop its digital terrestrial 
services in order to get a competitive advantage in the digital era.  
At the same time, ERT’s management has aimed to reduce labour costs by applying a 
system of voluntary retirement of some of its personnel. It should be noted that in 2002 
ERT’s management aimed to retire 1062 of its personnel through a redundancy plan. This 
plan was considered because 76% of ERT’s revenues went to payroll and only 24% to 
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production and to the upgrading of the technical infrastructure (see also Tsourvakas, 2004). 
By following this path, ERT’s management considered that on the one hand, it would reduce 
one of the major financial burdens on the company, and on the other, by saving money it 
would have resources to invest in programming and respond to technological 
developments. It also decided to reduce the number of external collaborators and increase 
the productivity of its existing personnel. These projected savings, in the event, did not 
materialise, however, as it had to increase the number of staff to undertake its new 
ventures (see Papathanassopoulos, 2010).   
Far from disappearing, ERT’s financial problems did not disappear, but grew.  These 
can also be attributed to the lack of adequate funding, since the monthly licence fee today is 
about €3 per household (reduced from €4.7 in 2013, due to the ongoing economic crisis). 
Lack of resources obviously does not allow for strong indigenous production and quality 
programming, necessary for improving ERT’s reputation. On the other hand, in the era of 
fiscal crisis this may be a myth. ERT’s license fee, compared to the  EU average, is very 
significantly lower.  But ERT’s income, compared to their private/commercial counterparts, 
is very high. In 2018, ERT is projected to have a revenue at €200 million. €194 million comes 
from the licence fee, whereas €14 million will come from sales (advertising and sponsorship, 
principally). Against the backdrop of these financial worries, the Syriza-Anel government, 
following in the footsteps of its predecessors, continues to claw back €40 million of ERT’s 
revenues to subsidise alternative electric power sources and research and development, in 
direct contravention of its obligations under the Amsterdam Protocol. Although their 
revenue has been seriously compromised by the government’s actions, ERT still has an 
income of about €160 million (staff wages total is no more than €60 million), when the 
advertising market for their private counterparts is no more than €250 million. In other 
words, ERT, financially, is in better shape than its private competitors. Thus, ERT’s 
management should invest, as a priority, in Greek production and investigative journalism, 
fulfilling its remit. In the last three years after its re-opening, ERT has commissioned a 
number of Greek productions but has invested very little in journalism, apart from re-hiring 
a number of journalists – some for political criteria, it would appear. 
 
ERT as a vehicle for the development of digital terrestrial television 
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While there was no digital or analogue cable television service in Greece, digital terrestrial 
television became the next priority for the country, mainly due in part to the EU 
recommendation for member states to switch from analogue to digital broadcasting by 
2012 (Iosifidis 2006). The Conservative government of Costas Karamanlis aimed to 
undertake the switchover of the Greek television industry to digital terrestrial television 
(DTT) through the public broadcaster (Papathanassopoulos 2014) and give ERT the role that 
most Western European governments were giving to their public broadcasters: to be the 
vehicle for the development of DTT in the country. 
Thus, as in many other European countries (Iosifidis 2007b), ERT acted as a pioneer, 
introducing DTT exclusive television services to the Greek public. In effect, ERT undertook a 
pilot project launching three new entirely channels in the first half of 2006 which were 
available only on digital terrestrial television. ERT started broadcasting DTT channels before 
any legislative framework was in place in Greece. The channels were broadcasted free-to-air 
and were funded exclusively from ERT’s budget, as they carried no advertisements 
(according to ERT’s officials the PSB did not want to offend or alienate the commercial 
broadcasters by eroding their advertising revenues) (TV International, 2007). The 
conservative government assigned two multiplexes to ERT – with four channel spots each 
(DVB-T & MPEG-2). Despite the fact that the government had clearly stated that ERT’s DTT 
broadcasting was a pilot scheme, the legislative vacuum had to be filled. At that time, ERT’s 
digital terrestrial offerings were only available in Athens, Thessaloniki and a handful of other 
major cities (see Papathanassopoulos, 2014). 
On 19 July 2007, the government, through the Law 3592/2007, tried to establish a 
comprehensive legislative framework that would integrate it with the new regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services being pursued by the EU. 
The legislation made a clear distinction between ‘platform-’ and ‘multiplex operator’ 
(sometimes it is called ‘network operator’) and the ‘content provider’. The platform- or 
multiplex operator was under a general license regime, provided that his 
undertaking/company was registered by the Hellenic Telecommunications & Post 
Commission (E.E.T.T.). The Ministry of Transport & Communications and the Ministry of 
Press and the Media were responsible for establishing the digital frequencies map and 
planning. The new Act makes it possible for licensed television stations to transmit their 
analogue TV programmes digitally, using frequencies that are to be allocated for the period 
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up until the digital switchover. The majority of those frequencies were used for analogue TV 
broadcasting by local TV stations but the frequencies will be cleared so as to be available 
only for digital terrestrial TV broadcasting. The procedure for licensing digital terrestrial 
television stations was to be regulated through a Presidential Decree. 
Nevertheless, the 2007-2013 period could be characterized as a period of stagnation. 
In the case of digital television, ERT did not bring to fruition the expansion of its DTT 
network, leaving the majority of Greek towns and regions (apart from Athens and 
Thessaloniki) with no DTT signal. This delay was attributed to efforts by the Conservative 
government to encourage commercial analogue TV broadcasters to collaborate with ERT in 
forming a joint multiplex operator company that would act as the network operator for the 
whole Greek digital terrestrial platform. This plan would keep the costs of rolling out a 
nationwide DTT network at a reasonably low level, while fostering the necessary economies 
of scale (Papathanassopoulos, 2014). Commercial broadcasters and ERT were brought 
together to the negotiating table but the talks did not produce the desired outcome. 
Commercial broadcasters decided to continue to rely on their strengths and in June 2009 
they formed a joint network operator company, called Digea. Digea was established by the 
seven major commercial TV stations in Greece (MEGA, Antenna TV, ALPHA, STAR, Alter, TV 
Macedonia and SKAI) and started broadcasting (simulcasting the analogue channels in two 
multiplexes) utilizing DVB-T MPEG-4 in September 2009 from an area in the Corinthian Gulf 
in the Peloponnese (see Galanis, 2009). 
ERT, on the other hand, “reactivated” its plans and started moving to the Greek 
periphery, executing regional switch offs in Thrace, Thessaly and the northern part of 
Peloponnese by the end of 2011 (ERT, 2011). Furthermore, the public broadcaster aimed to 
rearrange the channels spot in the two multiplexes by merging two digital channels and 
creating a new one, ERT HD. ERT, in this phase was managing two multiplexes: the first 
(DVB-T, MPEG-2) that comprised public channels: PRISMA+, CINE/SPORT+, the 
Parliamentary Channel and the Cypriot RIKSAT, while the second (DVB-T, MPEG-4) would 
comprise the ‘old’ analogue channels (ET1, NET, ERT3), plus the new ERT HD channel. ERT 
included five radio stations in the offering of its second multiplex (Vernadou, 2010).  
For some, ERT’s digital project was an indirect way for the government to get rid of 
the ‘old’ ERT with its problems and inefficiencies,and in particular to break the dominance 
of ERT’s unions (Papathanassopoulos, 2014). The ERT employees’ union, POSPERT, 
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conducted a series of work stoppages to protest at the adoption of Law 3592/2007 as a 
threat to the public character of ERT, bringing newscasts to a temporary standstill. ESIEA, 
the Union of Athens Dailies’ Journalists, and the Greek Federation of Labour supported 
POSPERT’s protest. The government responded that ERT Digital was created by the previous 
socialist government, which also envisaged the entire privatisation of ERT Digital 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2014).  
  But the financial crisis affected the public broadcaster and so ERT, in the end, 
abandoned its digital channels under the banner of ERT Digital. In March 2013, the socialist-
led government decided to close down ERT Digital, with its three digital channels. The 
government, in an unprecedented move, decided to broadcast BBC World, Deutsche Welle 
(in English), Euronews (in English) and TV5 Europe (in French), in what had been ERT 
Digital’s allocated frequencies. Obviously, the government decided to transmit these 
international channels in order to maintain the frequencies  (Papathanassopoulos, 2014). In 
the meantime, the Samaras Government was critical of ERT, since it considered that ERT’s 
union, PROSPERT, was overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition, in particular the leftist 
SYRIZA party, a fact that was reflected in the public broadcaster’s news output. In practice, 
the government left the development of DTT entirely to the private broadcasters, which it 
lauded as ‘champions’. Thus, Digea has emerged as the sole provider of DTT in Greece and 
consequently has a monopoly on DTT, as well as holding a dominant position in the DTT 
market in particular and digital television in general. The case of Euronews is, perhaps, 
indicative. As the European channel began to broadcast in the Greek language, the public 
broadcaster, following government orders, excluded Euronews from ERT’s digital terrestrial 
frequencies. Eventually, the Greek switchover was completed on February 6, 2015 by Digea. 
Those people who had bought set-top boxes or new TV sets with the previous MpEG-2 
format were now forced to purchase new set-top boxes or new TV sets. Some were even 
forced to buy new reception equipment since Digea broadcast in MPGE-4 format. The 
transition from analogue to digital TV transmission was, however, a boon for consumer 
electronics stores, suffering from a downturn in sales due to the economic crisis, as the 
changing of formats forced the viewing public to buy new TV sets and reception equipment  




The Closing down and the re-opening of the ERT and the lost chance for ERT to become a 
public service institution 
 
On Tuesday, 11 June 2013, the screen of the public broadcaster ERT went black, as it was 
closed down practically overnight. The radio stations of the Greek public broadcaster had 
already been silent for a few hours. The conservative-led coalition government of Prime 
Minister Antonis Samaras had a few hours earlier announced its decision to close down and 
to restructure the public broadcasting service in Greece (Avgi, 2013).   Government 
spokesman Simos Kedikoglou, said in a televised statement, broadcast on ERT on the night 
of ERT’s closure: "At a time when the Greek people are enduring sacrifices, there is no room 
for delay, hesitation or tolerance of sacred cows." ERT's channels and radio station would 
cease operations after midnight and be relaunched at a later date as a leaner organisation, 
Kedikoglou said. "ERT is a typical example of unique lack of transparency and incredible 
waste. And that ends today," Kedikoglou said. "It costs three- to seven times as much as 
other TV stations and [has] four- to six times the personnel – for a very small viewership, 
about half that of an average private station." (The Guardian, 2013) 
The closing down of the public broadcaster by the government provoked an angry 
reaction among opposition parties and trade unions. The opposition, led by SYRIZA, claimed 
that the government had fired ERT’s 2,500 employees in order to prove to Greece’s 
international lenders (the so called ‘Troika,’ including the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Commission, and the European Central Bank) that it was serious about cutting the 
country’s bloated public sector (4000 jobs to go by the end of 2013). Moreover, the 
European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), press 
associations, as well as more than 50 Directors General of European Public Broadcasters 
including the BBC, ARD, ZDF, Rai, RTVE, RTBF and France Télévisions reacted to this decision, 
condemning the Greek government’s “undemocratic and unprofessional” course of action, 
which “undermines the existence of public service media in Greece” (EBU, 2013a). 
Additionally, the EBU relayed ERT’s signal via satellites (via Hotbird 13A in Europe, APSTAR 7 
in Asia and Intelsat 19 in Oceania as well as via the Internet web page). In effect, ERT made 
use of new technologies by sending its signal via hundreds of Internet sites and social media; 
it adopted a new cooperative method of news production and content, it managed to host 
various views and voices and finally achieve ratings never previously achieved in its history: 
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2.8 million single users watched its programmes in the first days from the EBU site (EBU, 
2013b). On the other hand, the government asked all private media stations to stop re-
broadcasting ERT programmes, arguing that any broadcast bearing the logo ERT, would ‘face 
disciplinary action’. 
More than a month later, a transitional TV channel called ‘Public Television’, formed 
by the government in the aftermath of a decision by the Court of Appeals that a channel 
with a public service mission should stay on, and in response to the international and local 
outcry, started transmitting a poor diet of programming based on old documentaries, films 
and subsequently, news on the ERT’s digital frequencies. Although, for some the motives of 
Samaras government were clearly political, as his government considered ERT’s union to be 
overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition, in particular the SYRIZA party, a fact that was 
reflected in ERT’s news output. But the decision to close or to undertake the major 
restructuring of ERT goes back to the early years of the Restoration of the Parliament when 
Sir Hugh Greene was amazed by the tight governmental control of the state broadcaster or 
when the BBC’s experts came to a similar conclusion in early 1990s (Papathanassopoulos, 
1993). More recently, the then minister of state during the George Papandreou socialist 
administration responsible for the public broadcaster, Professor Elias Mosialos had also 
announced his plans on 18 August 2011. 
Mosialos proposed the formation of a public broadcaster that would not be 
politicized, giving greater emphasis to multimedia platforms and which would be cheaper to 
maintain. The latter was within the government’s plans to reduce spending. He suggested 
that an independent committee would look to the management structures of public 
broadcasters in the UK, Sweden, France and Germany for examples to follow. The measures 
he announced included the closure of ET1 and ERTs digital channels Cine Plus and Sport 
Plus, which had already merged into a single channel. ERTs other channel on the digital 
platform, Prisma, would remain but would be aimed at disabled people. ET3, the TV channel 
based in Thessaloniki, would be designated as a regional channel, covering cultural, 
entertainment and sports-related issues. Satellite channel ERT World would continue in its 
current format. Public radio, ERA, would also be affected by the changes. Five of its 20 
medium-wave transmitters would be shut down and 19 regional stations would be merged 
into nine. Thessaloniki, which had three state radio stations, would now only have one. 
Moreover, the City of Athens’ multilingual radio station, AIR 104.4FM, would be merged 
16 
 
with ERA’s Filia 106.7FM. Radiotileorasi, the weekly TV and radio listings magazine, would 
also be closed. An ERT building in Thessaloniki and one in Athens would be used to house 
government departments, thereby saving more public money. A process to evaluate the 
employees at ERT was also set to begin. 
The closure of ERT could be described as a government failure for various reasons. 
The government said that the ERT’s closure was as a move to appease the country’s lenders 
(Guardian, 2013), who claimed that Greece had an overextended public sector that had to 
be cut. But, the closure is of interest mainly the way in which the decision was taken and 
executed. Notably, in an era in which public broadcasters have been disputed in various 
ways, the government’s decision to close down overnight an institution that was closely 
associated with the history of Greek radio and television demonstrates how the political 
world in Greece understands public service broadcasting, i.e., the party in power considers 
itself as the owner of the public (state) media. This incomprehensible and dangerous 
attitude seems to have followers, not only among Greek politicians but in other European 
countries (see Poland, Hungary, Turkey, etc.).   
 In the even, ERT was replaced by a new public broadcaster, NERIT (New Hellenic 
Radio Internet Television). As the closing down of ERT continued to be a bone of contention 
and a source of much controversy, those responsible for NERIT found that their hands were 
tied. The government declared that (in theory at least) the broadcaster would be 
independent in line with Western counterparts. However, in reality the government 
regarded it as its own political mouthpiece (Galanis, 2014). Its chairman and managing 
director Professor Antonis Makrydimitris and his deputy, journalist Rudolph Moronis, 
resigned after just four months in post. As Moronis wrote in his Facebook account: “When 
they [the government] said they wanted a true public service broadcaster, the problem was 
they did not mean it.” POSPERT’s efforts to reverse the decision led them to attempt to rally 
people in northern Greece against the government “of Athens” by staging a month-long sit-
in at the studios used by ERT’s Thessaloniki channel, ET3. They used the ET3 equipment for 
their pirate programming, relayed by ESIEA’s website, in which they accused the 
government of attempting to stifle the voice of the north. While the conservative 
government stated that the second NERIT channel would be based in Thessaloniki, SYRIZA 
said that it would restore ERT as it used to be if and when it camesto power. 
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On 11 July 2015, employees of Greece’s state television ERT hugged each other and 
cried as the channel aired its first broadcast in two years. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras made 
its re-opening one of his priorities as part of efforts to roll back cuts demanded by the 
lenders, and called it “a great victory for democracy.” (iefimerida.gr 2015). The government 
re-hired all of the roughly 2,500 staff who had been made redundant, including 600 
journalists, at a cost of about €30 million a year.  
 After three almost years of ERT’s new operation, the public broadcaster’s audience 
ratings remain low (approximately 11% according to Media Nielsen ratings of the television 
market share for the three channels). In effect, neither government attitudes toward the 
state broadcaster nor ERT’s dubious  efficiency have changed. In effect, the ‘model’ of state 
broadcaster as mainly news-oriented (in effect government propaganda) surrounded by 
entertainment programming has remained intact, even in the age of social media. Several 
months after returning to the airwaves, ERT issued an open call for new programming — a 
faint ray of light for the struggling industry. Needless to say, all key radio and television 
appointees were once again politically sympathetic of or affiliated to the SYRIZA-led 
coalition government. The ‘new’ ERT employs 2,307 staff. Most of them (2,114) have been 
employed on the basis of their previous job in ‘old’ ERT.  According to ‘new’ ERT structure, 
the broadcaster consists of six Directorates (Divisions), and is run by the Chairman and the 
Managing Director, as well as the Board of Directors (seven members). The Divisions cover 
News and Current Affairs, Content, ERT 3, New media and technology, as well as the 
Administration and Financing.  Additionally, ERT’s organization chart includes 3 special 
Divisions (Corporate Communication, Archives and Music) as well as ERT’s Legal Office.  
Needless to say, the Chairman, the Managing Director and 3 members of the Board of 
Directors are nominated by the Minister of State responsible for public media and are 
appointed by Parliament, where the government has a majority (as foreseen by the Law 
4324/2015). The other two members are elected by ERT’s employees.  However they are 
nominated, all members of the Board of Governors are appointed, according to the Law 
4324/2015, article 9) by the Minister of the State responsible for the public media 
(nowadays this jurisdiction has been moved to the Minister of Digital Policy, 
Telecommunication and the Media). In other words, the criteria of appointing ERT’s 
management are primarily political, not to say, partisan, rather than according to their 
media expertise or their plans for the state broadcaster’s future. 
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 Since the re-launch of ERT there have been various comments and accusations that 
the SYRIZA-Anel government continues to exercise tight control over the public broadcaster 
in the manner of its predecessors. Helena Sheehan notes her in book on Syriza, The Syriza 
Wave, that:  
“in government, instead of affirming and building on what this popular struggle had 
achieved, (Syriza) disregarded the popular demand for a new model of public broadcasting, 
based on critical and creative programming and worker’s self-management. Instead, they 
reinstated the old order and hierarchical management. Instead, of public broadcasting, it 
became government broadcasting, as it had been previously, except that Syriza was now the 
government whose line was privileged” (2016: 118) 
This echoes SYRIZA’s parliamentary spokesman Nikos Xydakis, who in a panel on “Protecting 
the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media,” described the situation at ERT 
as “tragic and Third World” (in Kathimerini, 6/3/2017).  His comments prompted an 
exchange of counter arguments between Opposition New Democracy and the SYRIZA press 
office, but also a demand for a retraction and an apology from ERT President Dimitris 
Tsaknis. In his response a day later, Monday he said that had been over-the-top in his 
statement but added that mistakes were made in relaunching ERT in May 2015 after it had 
been shut down for two years, saying it has been allowed to operate like a branch of the 
civil service (Kathimerini, 6/3/2017). In mid-April 2018, ERT’s journalists made an appeal, 




Most Greek politicians claim that control over the media equals political power. 
Deregulation, commercialisation and privatisation of the media and the dominance of 
television in the Greek media universe for news and entertainment forced politicians and 
political parties to adopt the media logic. Greek politicians have come to realise that they 
are more vulnerable than they were in the past. Former Prime Minister Constantine 
Mitsotakis once accused the “web of interests of media publishers” of being the main 
reason for his loss of power. Ex-chairman of the Hellenic Parliament and PASOK MP 
Apostolos Kaklamanis has attacked the media many times, especially media owners, on the 
grounds that they were using their channels to promote their own business interests. 
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Similar statements have been made by other politicians. Even Prime Minister Tsipras in his 
speech regarding television licences, delivered in Parliament in February 2016, painted a 
clientelist relationship between businessmen “who are maintained and financed by banks in 
order to support politically bankrupt parties” and the two parties which have governed 
Greece for decades. (Quoted in To Vima 2015). 
It could be argued that it is no coincidence that television licences have not been 
granted for 28 years. Indeed, the awarding of the licences seems to have been used as a 
part of the domestic political game. The reason of this policy is simple. Successive 
governments since 1989, the year of television deregulation, appear to have been playing an 
“on and off” game with television owners, who also have other interests in the Greek 
economy. In effect, they seem to use, on the one hand, the TV licences as a means of 
applying pressure and maintaining a competitive advantage in the tactical war with media 
and business entrepreneurs. On the other hand, political parties, especially those in power, 
want to maintain their control over the public broadcaster, echoing General De Gaulle’s 
quip that while their enemies have private television, they control the public broadcaster.  
In practice, they follow, as their counterparts in other Southern European counties, the 
pattern that the ruling party has the privilege of directly controlling public broadcasting in 
general, and management of the news and news output, in particular. In Greece, news 
editorial judgments are expected to be in close agreement with, if not identical to, 
government announcements across a whole range of policies. In other words, politicians 
want to have the upper hand on the public broadcaster since they feell vulnerable in a 
confrontation with the vested interests which at the same time own the mainstream private 
media of the country.  
Although we are at the end of the so-called Metapolitefse, the 40-year period of the 
restoration of the Parliament after the Dictatorship and the establishment of Democracy 
according to the Western rules and values, and Greece has entered the age of social media, 
the ‘old’ political behaviour remains strong. In practice, Greek politicians seem to act and 
react as though they were still living in an analogue world, rather than in the digital era.  The 
sudden closure of ERT is an indication of this attitude since the main cause was not the 
financial burden as the government announced. It was the feeling of losing the traditional 
tight governmental control over the state broadcaster news output. 
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In brief, it can be asserted without risk of contradiction, that public service 
broadcasting never really existed in Greece. The troubled political history of the country 
formed a state rather than a public broadcaster. In effect, in Greece the state broadcaster 
was unable to function according to the public service obligations observed in Britain, 
Scandinavia or other Northern European countries (Iosifidis, 2012).  
 Every  Managing Director who has taken up office has laid out grandiose plans for 
the public broadcaster, only for them to be precipitously abandoned on the first day of their 
tenure.  This trajectory of office is the true constant of the role of Managing Director: 
ambitions are enunciated but few, if any, of the office holders survive long enough to see 
their plans brought to fruition. The new ERT, everybody admits and the TV ratings confirm, 
has failed to distinguish itself. Regarding news,  the old governmental ‘behaviour’ is on show 
once again, while its programming is neither innovative nor attractive, leading to sharp 
words from independent media analysts and journalists and to falling ratings, as the viewing 
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ERT 1: Until ERT’s closure in 2013 was known as ET1. Since 2015 as ERT1 
ERT 2: in 1997 was formed to NET. Formerly was known as ET-2. Since 2015 as ERT2 
1997: after the restructure of ERT 
2013: until ERT’s closure 
2014: As NERIT with N1 and Nsports from summer 2014       
2015: for the period 15/6-30/12/2017 –the period of ERT’s reopening  
2017: data up to 29/10/2017 
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